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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last quarter century many countries around the world
have undergone major political change, namely transition from
authoritarian regime to democratic rule, often in the wake of vio-
lent internal conflicts. In an effort to quench the enflamed ten-
sions that customarily accompany such transitions, these
democracies have attempted to come to terms with past atrocities
by establishing investigatory commissions to uncover the truths of
the past. Typically known as "truth and reconciliation commis-
sions," these commissions have played a critical role in countries
around the world that had to confront a past scarred by oppressive
military regimes, civil strife, protracted violence, and gross
human rights violations.
Since the early 1980's, Latin American countries have sought
to heal the wounds of their nations after periods of widespread
human rights violations through the use of investigatory commis-
sions.1 Investigatory efforts have been undertaken in Chile by
democratically elected governments that replaced military dicta-
torships,2 as well as United Nations (U.N.) sponsored commissions
as part of a U.N. mediated peace process in El Salvador.' The
nations of Chile and El Salvador established truth commissions in
an effort to uncover the reality of past human rights violations,
report the findings to the public, make recommendations for
changes to avoid repeating the abuses, and ease tensions in their
politically-charged countries. Though the assembly, methods, and
results of each of these commissions varied greatly, both were
notable successes in their own right and each serves as a distinct
model to achieve the shared ultimate goal of all nations coming to
terms with a history of human rights violations and national
healing.
This comment presents a broad overview of what truth com-
missions are, why they are used, and what are the inherent
advantages and disadvantages of this approach to meeting
1. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 600, 613 (1994). In 1982, Bolivia became the first Latin
American Country to establish a truth commission. President Hernan Siles Zuaro
created a "National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances" just days after the
return to democratic rule in October 1982. Id.
2. See generally, Jose Zalaquett, Introduction to the English Edition of REPORT OF
THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, at xxiii (Philip E.
Berryman trans., 1993). [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO CHILEAN REPORT].
3. United Nations, El Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace, U.N. Department
of Public Information, No. 1208-92614 (1992) [hereinafter Path to Peace.
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nation's needs. The two distinct models of truth commissions
established by Chile and El Salvador will be historically and criti-
cally examined. The processes and achievements of each model
will be compared and contrasted, ultimately uncovering that
though these two commissions share few similarities, they share
the same ability to match the needs of the nation in which they
were employed.
A. What is a Truth Commission?
The term truth commission is used generically for a wide vari-
ety of bodies set up to investigate a past history of human rights
violations in a given country.4 Violations by the military or other
governmental forces or by armed opposition forces are often
included.' There is no fixed model for a truth commission; the sys-
tem, staff, authority, and mission may vary significantly from one
commission to the next.' Some truth commissions have been sig-
nificantly limited from a full and fair accounting of the past - lim-
ited by mandate, by political constraints or restricted access to
information, or by a lack of resources.' Because truth commis-
sions have reported only a fraction of the "truth," the title of
"investigating commission" might be a more accurate reflection of
what a commission does.' The investigations these commissions
conduct are largely a product of their mandate and composition.
Though no two commissions are identically composed, there are
some elements that are common to almost all truth commissions.
Truth commissions are comprised of four primary elements
according to Priscilla Hayner, an expert on truth commissions:
(1) A truth commission focuses on the past; (2) a truth com-
mission is not focused on a specific event, but attempts to
paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or
violations of international humanitarian law, over a period
of time; (3) a truth commission usually exists for a set
period of time, ceasing to exist with the submission of a
report of its findings; and (4) a truth commission is always
vested with some sort of authority, by way of its sponsor,
that allows it access to information, security, or protection
to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its
4. Hayner, supra note 1, at 600.
5. Hayner, supra note 1, at 600.
6. Hayner, supra note 1, at 607.
7. Hayner, supra note 1, at 600.
8. Angelika Schlunck, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 4 INT'L L.
STUDENTS ASS'N J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 417 (1998).
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report.'
Hayner's four primary elements are a description of some
common features; however, there may be a variation of other fea-
tures. Commissions may be ad hoc sponsored by the executive or
legislative branches of government," international commissions
under the U.N. or regional auspices," or may operate under a
more permanent national structure like an ombudsman's office.12
Following the example of Argentina, at least twenty-five countries
have used a combination of truth and reconciliation commissions
and amnesties to facilitate the transition to a public order of
human dignity.1 3 The International Human Rights Law Institute
at DePaul University in Chicago completed an empirical study in
1997 on international and non-international conflicts since World
War I. The study found that from 229 international and internal
conflicts, excluding the classic interstate armed conflicts, nine
were the subject of a truth commission, while twenty-four were
subject to domestic prosecution and two of international prosecu-
tion. The most widely known example is the Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission established in 1995 in South Africa to examine
Apartheid-Era crimes. 4 Unfortunately, for most of these conflicts,
unlike in South Africa, there were no redress mechanisms in
place. 5
9. Hayner, supra note 1, at 604.
10. Hayner, supra note 1, at 613-16. For instance, in Bolivia, the National
Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances was created by presidential decree, so
was the Argentinean National Commission on the Disappeared in 1983. Uruguay
established the Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared People and
its Causes through act of parliament in 1985. Id. at 613-16.
11. Belisario Betancur, Reinaldo Figuerdo Planchart, & Thomas Buergenthal,
From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on
the Truth for El Salvador, at http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/elsalvador/
tc es 03151993_toc.html (last visited February 12, 2001)[hereinafter FROM MADNESS
TO HOPE]. The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was created through the
Peace Accord between FMLN and the Salvadoran government under the mediation of
the United Nations, signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on January 16,
1992. Id.
12. Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory
Commissions in Latin America, 20 L. & Soc. INQuIRY 79 (1995).
13. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and
Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human
Dignity, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 316, 330-31 (1999).
14. NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION ACT, No. 1111, (July 26, 1995), available
at http://www.truth.org.za/legal/act9534.htm [hereinafter UNITY ACT].
15. Schlunck, supra note 8, at 416 (referring to Jennifer Balint, An Empirical
Study of Conflicts (of an International and Non-International Character, Civil
Conflicts and Tyrannical Regime Victimization) and Their Outcomes Since World
War II, Report to The United States Meeting of Experts on Reigning in Impunity for
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Most truth commissions are created at a point of political
transition within a country, used to demonstrate an end to a past
record of human rights abuses, to promote reconciliation among
the people, and to stabilize political legitimacy."5 Truth commis-
sions, therefore, must be distinguished from formal legal account-
ability achieved through the prosecution of individuals' in legal
tribunals. Prosecutions are very rare after a truth commission
report, and in most cases there is no trial of any kind, even if the
report has indicated the identity of the violators.17 Often amnesty
is granted to the perpetrators, such as any member of the mili-
tary, before the commission begins its investigation in order to
enable the commission to receive accurate information from per-
sons who otherwise would be unwilling to reveal the truth of past
crimes."'
In short, the indefinite nature of the truth commission allows
it to range from elaborate multi-body commissions such as the
1995 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 19 to
one-man-commissions with very limited resources as in Hondu-
ras.20 There need be no fixed model: in the unique circumstances
of each nation, other new and innovative forms for a truth com-
mission may yet be developed." This allows each commission to
International Crimes and Serious Violations of Human Rights (Apr. 13, 1997) held in
Washington, D.C., International Human Rights Law Institute DePaul University
College of Law).
16. Hayner, supra note 1, at 604.
17. Hayner, supra note 1, at 604. Only in a few cases, such as in Bolivia,
Argentina and Ethiopia, have there been trials in conjunction with or as a result of
the truth commission investigations. Id.
18. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 12. Witnesses are often reluctant to testify
to courts because they fear reprisals. When state institutions have been notoriously
unreliable and unable to protect the victims of human rights violations, far more than
a state change in policy will be needed to overcome legitimate fears. Amnesty is often
the only solution to this problem. Id.
19. UNITY ACT, supra note 13. According to chapter 2, section 3, paragraph 3 of the
Act, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission consists of three
separate commissions with different functions: the Commission of Human Rights (ch.
2, sec. 3, para. 3, sub-para. (a)), the Commission for Amnesty (ch.2, sec. 3, para. 3,
sub-para. (b)), and the Commission for Reparation and Compensation (ch. 2, sec. 3,
para. 3, sub-para. (c)).
20. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 89-90. In 1992, President Callejas
created an ombudsman office known as the Commissioner for the Protection of
Human Rights. The President selected Leo Valladares from a list provided by a
National Reconciliation Commission. Valladares could only be removed by a two-
thirds vote of that commission. All civil and military authorities were to cooperate
with, and could not suspend, the Commissioner's investigations. Id.
21. Hayner, supra note 1, at 607.
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be molded to fit the particular circumstances and needs of the
nation in which it is established.
B. Why a Truth Commission?
A truth commission usually serves a myriad of purposes. Its
main function is to investigate the past under the protection and
authority of sanctioned fact finding.22 In conducting its investiga-
tion it establishes an objectively accurate record of a country's
past, providing an impartial history of a country and its govern-
ment's part in disputed acts.23 Another goal is to publish a report
that provides the public with the truth. Such an account serves as
an instrument of preservation and education, preventing history
from being rewritten by possible subsequent oppressive regimes,
and teaching its society valuable lessons from its past to circum-
vent repetition in the future.
The cathartic effect of such a report eases the heartache of
many of the family members left suffering from past violence. It is
generally true that the citizens, especially those who have suf-
fered a loss at the hands of their own nation, have a general idea
of who was responsible for what happened during periods of vio-
lence, yet still place high value on the findings of these reports.
From this it can be deduced that the true value of the commission
and its report is not in its findings of truth but in its acknowledge-
ment of the truth.24 "Acknowledgement implies that the state has
admitted its misdeeds and recognized that it was wrong."2 Juan
Mendez, then director of Americas Watch, writes, "[knowledge
that is officially sanctioned, and thereby made 'part of the cogni-
tive scene'.. . acquires a mysterious quality that is not there when
it is merely 'truth.' Official acknowledgment at least begins to
heal the wounds."26
The psychological importance of recognizing involvement that
has long been denied can play a key role in the healing process of a
society marred by conflict. Finally, a key objective of many com-
missions is not simply to report misdeeds, but to propose how past
wrongs should be reconciled.
22. Hayner, supra note 1, at 607.
23. Hayner, supra note 1, at 607.
24. Hayner, supra note 1, at 607.
25. Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?, THE NEW YORK REV. OF
BooKs, 1 Feb. 1990, at 34.
26. Juan E. Mendez, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts With Torturers, 8
N.Y.L. Sc. J. HUM. RTs. 557, 583(1991)(citing Professor Thomas Nagel of New York
University for his articulation of this distinction).
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The commission is usually established during a time of refor-
mation, which is why recommendations for reform can often play
a crucial role in the effectiveness of the commission. Though not
all commissions make recommendations, many do. These recom-
mendations have covered military and police reform, the strength-
ening of democratic governments, measures to promote national
reconciliation, reparations for the victims of violence, and reform
of the judicial system.27 Though these recommendations typically
carry no legal obligation, they can serve as a catalyst for future
reform and as goals that the people of the nation can point to in
their quest for political reorganization.
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Truth
Commissions
Most human rights organizations feel that the contributions
of a truth commission outweigh any possible negative aspects that
may accompany them.28 One of the greatest advantages of a truth
commission is its flexibility. It has the ability to adapt to the
needs of each country in composition, authority, and mission.
Furthermore, truth commissions hold the distinctly advantageous
ability to be established almost instantly at a relatively low cost.29
This is very important for many of the countries implementing a
truth commission because they are often economically limited and
in need of immediate reform. As a temporary organization with a
limited mandate that is designed according to specific needs of a
country, it meets the need for rapid resolution in a period of gov-
ernment transition.
Some human rights activists favor criminal prosecution,
rather than investigatory commissions, as the best prohibitive
action against future violations.30 The use of criminal tribunals,
however, poses many problems that often leave such an option
inapt. First, creating an independent judicial tribunal to adjudi-
cate these crimes requires constitutional provisions and both pro-
cedural and substantive codes of operations that would typically
require years to implement." It will similarly take time to rebuild
a weakened domestic criminal justice system to the point where it
27. Hayner, supra note 1, at 609.
28. Hayner, supra note 1, at 607.
29. Schlunck, supra note 8, at 419.
30. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991).
31. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 82.
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can undertake credible trials for war crimes or similar mass
abuses.32 Such delays would defeat the goal of promoting immedi-
ate healing. Second, mass atrocities can only be perpetrated by a
large number of people. The multitude of participants and mas-
sive amounts of evidence concerning each case make it logistically
and economically untenable to use a criminal court system."
Unlike the criminal court system, proceedings before a commis-
sion do not have to follow the rigid rules of evidence and criminal
procedure. 4 With this time hindrance removed, a truth commis-
sion's ability to gather and evaluate evidence and to hear the testi-
mony of witnesses is far more accommodating. Accordingly, more
cases can be resolved with a better general picture of what hap-
pened in the past.
It is true, however, that with the removal of the rules of evi-
dence and criminal procedure, the indicia of reliability sought
after in the judicial process diminishes. In addition, the propen-
sity for errors in fact finding increases. No matter which system
is used, erroneous testimony is an inevitable danger due to such
factors as lack of clear recollection or ulterior motives. With
proper safeguards, truth commissions can reduce error in their
fact finding and meet a level of reliability that rivals that of any
average adjudicative process.
Third, though criminal prosecution at the international level
may be a viable alternative for the most severe cases, e.g. prosecu-
tion for genocide, it is much less viable at the national level. The
reality in most of these transitional democracies is that there is no
desire to begin assigning individual blame to officials still in pow-
erful positions for fear that it would disrupt the democracy that
the new government is attempting to solidify. Also, many crimes
committed by political forces were technically legal under the then
existing regime creating an unfairness of imposing penalties ex
post facto. The inadequate resources available at the local level to
the government to hear cases and of the victims to bring the cases
before the courts further compounds the problem of establishing
criminal tribunals at the national level.
Finally, it is a common misperception that the use of truth
commissions and the holding of trials are mutually exclusive.
32. Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms With Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127,
142 (1996).
33. Id. at 138-39.
34. Schlunck, supra note 8, at 419.
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This is not necessarily the case. The first commission of note,
established in Argentina in 1983, produced significant amounts of
information, which was then utilized by the authorities in prose-
cuting members of the military junta that had ruled the country."
The two processes, therefore, can actually complement one
another.
Though the advantages of truth commissions usually heavily
outweigh the advantages of criminal proceedings, critics still have
other legitimate concerns about the possible disadvantages of
investigatory commissions. One consideration is that commis-
sions set up by some governments might simply be seeking to
manipulate the public perception of past misdeeds under the veil
of disclosure. Particularly in situations where there is interna-
tional pressure that the government, even the successor govern-
ment, take action by accounting for crimes of the past, authorities
may establish a commission but deny it the authority needed to
conduct a sufficient investigation. 6 For example, a government
can deny certain necessities of an effective investigation, such as,
adequate funding, ample staffing, a reasonable time period within
to work, authority to investigate certain types of crimes, and
access to potentially incriminating documents. Depending on
these factors, it is not always clear whether a government-spon-
sored commission is an actual sign of reformation or simply a tool
of political distortion. Given this dynamic, the flexibility that
serves as such a strength of a truth commission also proves to be
its salient weakness. 8
Another weakness cited is that even if the truth commission
produces a comprehensive report, those findings can only have an
impact if the public has unconstrained access to them and if the
government will allow for the changes recommended and endorsed
35. Kritz, supra note 32, at 143.
36. Under international law, the successor government is responsible for the acts
of the prior regime, even though it in fact had no control over them and was often the
victim of the prior regime. The law does not provide for situations where, for
example, the military is not under the actual control of the government. Additionally,
international recognition that states have a duty to investigate, prosecute, and
provide some form of redress for the victims of certain human rights violations such
as widespread and systematic summary executions, disappearances, and torture has
increased dramatically in the last decade. These crimes fall under a subset of crimes
that must be prosecuted as they have been determined to fall outside the scope of
political crime amnestiable under international law. See Orentlicher, supra note 29,
at 2595; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave
Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449 (1990).
37. Hayner, supra note 1, at 608.
38. Schlunck, supra note 8, at 420.
2002]
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by the people. 9 The non-binding nature of the recommendations,
however, allows the governing body to dismiss the findings as
inaccurate." Truth commissions, therefore, are inherently vulner-
able to political disposition.
Despite the concerns some critics have of truth commissions,
most critics are very positive overall about the ability of these
commissions to maintain stability and promote healing in nations
emerging from a period of sustained human rights violations. As
domestic demands for answers are echoed by the international
community, many governments have increasingly turned to the
truth commissions as the most effective, expeditious, and rela-
tively low-cost way to meet those demands.
II. A TRUTH COMMISSION FOR CHILE:
THE RETTIG COMMISSION
A. The Socio-Political Context
After seventeen years of military rule, Chile returned to dem-
ocratic government under President Patricio Aylwin in March
1990.41 His election was part of a transitional process designed by
the military government, which allowed elections in exchange for
the political parties' agreement to adhere to the constitutional
structure established by the military.42 The former head of gov-
ernment, General Augusto Pinochet, remained as head of the mili-
tary despite the election of a civilian president.' Furthermore, a
number of seats in the Senate were reserved for Pinochet's exclu-
sive appointment, rather than election, and military and judicial
structures remained unchanged."
The prior military regime had a history of repressive and vio-
lent acts including forced exile, torture, summary execution, kid-
napping, and unlawful detention. 45 According to the Chilean
military regime itself, between 1973 and 1975 there were at least
42,486 political detentions, with 12,134 individual and 26,431
39. Schlunck, supra note 8, at 420.
40. See Richard Goldstone, Exposing Human Rights Abuses-A Help or Hindrance
to Reconciliation?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 607, 613 (1995). In El Salvador, after the
submission of the UN report, the El Salvador Military rejected the report as illegal
and only five days later, the legislature passed a general amnesty. Id.
41. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 84.
42. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 84.
43. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 84.
44. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 84.
45. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 84.
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political arrests.4" The Latin American Institute on Mental Health
and Human Rights ("ILAS") estimates that ten percent of the
Chilean population in the 1980's was affected by the "repressive
situation," defined as being subject to arrests and threats or hav-
ing relatives in prison.47 ILAS believed this to be a conservative
estimate. Additionally, ILAS reported that at least 200,000 indi-
viduals were subject to situations of "extreme trauma," defined as
forced exile, torture, execution, and detention of immediate family
members.4"
B. Creation Through Completion of the Rettig
Commission
Despite the authoritative military presence, President Aylwin
established a "National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation"
(Comisi6n Nacional para la Verdad y Reconciliaci6n) to investi-
gate the human rights violations resulting in death or disappear-
ance under the military regime's seventeen year rule.49 The
commission's mandate was to "clarify in a comprehensive manner
the truth about the most serious violations committed in recent
years," and "to gather evidence that may make it possible to iden-
tify the victims by name and determine their fate or wherea-
bouts."" Though the prior regime had a history of widespread
torture, arbitrary detention, and forced exile, any violations not
resulting in death were excluded from the investigation." Presi-
dent Aylwin's advisors felt that inclusion of all such infractions
would be too unmanageable an endeavor to be completed within
the time allotted the commission to conduct its inquiry. 2 The
investigation, therefore, only addressed cases of death or disap-
pearance under a policy of "all the truth and as much justice as
possible."5" The belief was that justice was unattainable because
46. Laura McHale, The Case Against General Augusto Pinochet, 27(3) A.B.A. LITIG.
49, 50 (2001). (citing Elizabeth Lira & Mara Isable Castillo, Psicologa de la Amenaza
Politica y del Mildo, ILAS (1991)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
5-6 (Philip E. Berryman trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1993). [hereinafter 1
CHILEAN REPORTI.
50. Id. at 6-7.
51. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 84.
52. David Weissbrodt & Paul W. Fraser, Report of the Chilean National
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 601 (1992).
53. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions and Amnesties in Latin America:
The Second Generation, 92 AM. SoC'Y INTL L. PRoc. 313 (1998).
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the military that perpetrated these heinous crimes yet remained a
powerful presence .
4
To maintain the integrity of the commission, President
Aylwin created a well-balanced eight member commission headed
by former Senator Raul Rettig.5 The commission was evenly
divided with four members from each of the opposing political
sides, pro and contra the former military regime." Members
included both conservative scholars and jurists close to the mili-
tary regime and human rights advocates who did not support the
regime.5 7 One notable commissioner, Jose Zalaquet, delivered the
prestigious Tobriner Memorial Lecture in 1991 and served a use-
ful role in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
5 8
The qualifications and diverse representation of the commission
gave it much needed credibility during the ensuing investigation.
The commission investigated over 3400 cases, and deter-
mined 2920 were within its mandate. The commission was allot-
ted nine months to complete its task and provided with a
substantial staff of sixty people to help accomplish this lofty goal.
The staff was divided into teams of two legal experts (a lawyer and
a law school graduate), each of which were assigned roughly 200
cases." Unlike many truth commissions, this commission thor-
oughly investigated each case, and had nearly unlimited access to
presidential records. The majority of disappearance cases were
taken to court during the former military regime because of
Chile's strong legal tradition." The detailed records left from
these proceedings allowed the commission to move swiftly through
the investigation. The commission interviewed thousands of wit-
nesses throughout the country and abroad. It also performed an
in depth examination of the documents of domestic and interna-
tional human rights groups. Forensic anthropologists aided the
54. Id.
55. 1 CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 49, at 7.
56. Wiessner & Willard, supra note 13, at 331.
57. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 82.
58. Goldstone, supra note 40, at 612.
59. 2 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
899-900 (Philip E. Berryman trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1993 [hereinafter
CHILEAN REPORT]. The Commission received 508 cases that did not fit within its
mandate and 449 in which only a name was provided; hence, there was no basis for
carrying out an investigation. Of the 2,920 within the commissions mandate, 2,025
were determined to be human rights violations perpetrated by state security forces;
ninety were the product of the armed opposition; 164 were the victims of political
violence; 641 cases were found to be inconclusive due to lack of evidence. Id.
60. Hayner, supra note 1, at 621.
61. Hayner, supra note 1, at 621.
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investigation by exhuming and identifying remains found in
unmarked cemeteries.2 Despite these efforts, the commission was
unable to establish the whereabouts of most victims, having pre-
sumed those forcibly disappeared to have been killed. The com-
mission had no power to subpoena witnesses, 3 and received little
information in their attempts to interview the military or police.'
Despite these challenges the commission was able to conduct a
thorough investigation resulting in a lengthy final report. 5
The commission's final, unanimous report was presented to
the President in February 1991.66 The report included an explana-
tion of the origins of the violations, the entities responsible, and
individual accounts of a substantial number of victims. In most
cases, however, even if the commission knew the names of the
individuals responsible, they had to refrain from naming those
persons because they were still serving in the armed forces and
were protected by their leader, General Pinochet 7 Therefore,
implications of the report were generally limited to branches of
the military and security forces, or opposition groups believed to
be responsible, instead of specific named parties.6 1
Additionally, the commission devoted a large portion of its
efforts on reporting the effects of these crimes on the victims, their
families, and society in general, and recommending future
action. 9 It recommended reparations to the victims and the
establishment of a "National Corporation for Reparation and Rec-
onciliation" to follow up the work of the commission and to oversee
the aforementioned reparations. ° Based on fears surrounding a
military threat of destabilization of the transitional democracy,
the commission decided from the outset that the best that could be
achieved was truth telling coupled with an extensive compensa-
tion program. The commission decided on this option rather than
an attempt to attain "justice" by legal punishment.71 Additionally,
the report called for human rights education for both the military
and civilians, greater judicial independence from the military, and
62. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 85.
63. 1 CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 49, at 14.
64. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 85.
65. 1 CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 49, at 14. The English translation by Berryman
of the CHILEAN REPORT is 907 pages in length.
66. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 85.
67. Wiessner & Willard, supra note 13, at 331.
68. INTRODUCTION TO CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 2, at xxxii.
69. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 85.
70. Hayner, supra note 1, at 622.
71. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 53, at 313.
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changes in the laws on states of emergency, military jurisdiction,
and criminal procedure generally.72 It recommended greater
adherence to international human rights laws, and called for the
creation of an ombudsman's office.73 Finally, it suggested that the
government honor the victims through monuments and support of
cultural and artistic work.74
C. The Government and Public Respond
President Aylwin presented the report to the public, one
month after he had received it, through a nationally televised
announcement. : He formally apologized to the victims and their
families on behalf of the government, and asked the military to
acknowledge its role in the past atrocities.76 The army did not
honor Aylwin's request, even though a grant of amnesty prevented
most of the persons responsible from being brought to justice.77
Despite this, human rights activists and the public alike met the
report with much acclaim." The report was reprinted and widely
circulated amongst the public and reported on by the press.
Unfortunately, within three weeks of the report's release,
there were three political assassinations diverting public and
media attention from the commission's report, cutting short the
public discussion of its findings.79 After the assassinations the
report did not resurface, and thousands of copies were kept out of
circulation to prevent political divisions."
Despite the unfortunate distractions surrounding the release
of the Rettig report, the government eventually implemented
72. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 86.
73. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 86.
74. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 86.
75. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 85.
76. Hayner, supra note 1, at 622.
77. INTRODUCTION TO CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 2, at xxxii. The army and the
navy publicly rejected the report, focusing mostly on a historical interpretation of the
Allende administration and the role of the military government. INTRODUCTION TO
CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 2, at xxxii.
78. Hayner, supra note 1, at 614.
79. The third assassination was of prominent right-wing senator Jaime Guzman
and, "effectively ended public discussion of the Rettig report." Americas Watch,
Human Rights and the "Politics of Agreements": Chile During President Aylwin's First
Year, 30 (1991).
80. In July 1992, Americas Watch reported, "the Rettig report with its deeply
disturbing revelations and conclusions has not resurfaced since [the assassinations],"
and "tens of thousands of copies of the report" were being withheld from the public,
stored in warehouses, to "avoid the political divisions reflected in the issue of past
abuses." Americas Watch, Chile: The Struggle for Truth and Justice for Past Human
Rights Violations, 2 (1992).
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many of its recommendations." In February 1992, the govern-
ment followed the commission's recommendation and established
a "National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation."82 The
object of the corporation was "the coordination, execution, and pro-
motion of the actions necessary for complying with the recommen-
dations contained in the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation
National Commission."' As a result, the corporation imple-
mented reparations including a subsidy for the education of the
victims' children, medical benefits, and a monthly pension plan for
the families of the victims. Furthermore, the two year mandate 4
of the corporation included investigating cases unresolved by the
commission, searching for the clandestine graves of the disap-
peared, and systematizing the records and files of the commission.
Despite all of the challenges and limitations the Rettig commis-
sion faced, it did a remarkable job of finding the truth85 and
achieving its goals of uncovering past human rights violations,
reporting these findings to the public, making recommendations
81. Hayner, supra note 1, at 622.
82. Hayner, supra note 1, at 622.
83. The law creating the corporation qualifies it as "a decentralized public service
subject to supervision of the President." Law Nr. 19,123, Ministry of the Interior,
Chile, translated in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How Emerging Democracies Reckon
With Former Regimes, Vol. III: LAws RULINGS AND REPORTS (Neil J. Kritz, ed., Wash.
D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace).
84. An available one-year extension of the corporation was allowed.
85. In describing the work of the commission, its member Jose Zalaquet Daher
analyzed the moving forces:
The truth was considered as an absolute, unrenounceable value for
many reasons: In order to provide for measures of reparation and
prevention, it must be clearly known what it is that ought to be
repaired and prevented. Further, society cannot simply black out a
chapter of its history, however differently the facts may be
interpreted. The void would be filled with lies or with conflicting
versions. The unity of a nation depends on a shared identity, which,
in turn, depends largely on a shared memory. The truth also brings
a measure of social catharsis and helps to prevent the past from
reoccurring. In addition, bringing the facts to light is, to some
extent, a form of punishment, albeit mild, in that it provokes social
censure against the perpetrators or the institutions or groups they
belonged to. But although the truth cannot really in itself dispense
justice, it does put an end to many a continued injustice-it does
not bring the dead back to life, but it brings them out from silence;
for the families of the "disappeared," the truth about their fate
would mean at last, the end to an anguishing, endless search. It
was deemed further that a thorough disclosure of truth was
feasible, although probably the whereabouts of the remains of most
disappeared will remain unknown.
INTRODUCTION TO CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 2, at xxiii, xxxi.
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for changes, and ultimately, easing tensions in their politically
charged country.
III. A TRUTH COMMISSION FOR EL SALVADOR: THE UNITED
NATIONS INTERVENES
A. A Bitter Civil War
For over a decade El Salvador was engaged in a bloody civil
war, claiming some 75,000 lives in the small nation of about five
million people. 6 From 1980 until 1992, the conflict raged as a
subtext to Cold War politics. The Salvadoran government, backed
by a Republican led United States, had been unable to defeat the
opposing forces of the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n
Nacional ("FMLN). 87 Outfitted by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other Soviet bloc countries, the alliance of five leftist insurgent
groups, better known as the FMLN, had fought vigorously but
could not defeat the Salvadoran military. The Salvadoran govern-
ment, however, could not quash the forces of the FMLN, as it was
the most effective guerrilla movement on the continent and
enjoyed substantial support inside El Salvador as well as interna-
tional recognition.88
The fighting was particularly merciless on the civilian popula-
tion. Both sides committed appalling acts of violence that
attracted worldwide attention. Such accounts included the assas-
sination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the murder of six Jesuit
priests, the rape and murder of four American church-women, the
systematic assassination of mayors, the killing of four off-duty
U.S. Embassy guards, the El Mozote massacre in which hundreds
of innocent civilians were slaughtered, the kidnapping and execu-
tion of national figures, and the countless acts of torture-killings.8 9
Of course, each side placed blame on the other for these
atrocities. 0
Finally, as the Cold War began to draw to an end in the early
1990's, it became apparent to both sides that neither was in a
position to defeat the other. As Cold War countries lost political
interest and the economic resources to back the hostilities, both
86. Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador,
27 VAND. J. TRANSNATVL L. 497, 502 (1994).
87. Id.
88. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 86.
89. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 503.
90. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 503.
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sides began to lack the funds9' and support 92 needed to carry on
their campaigns. At this time, the concept of negotiating a peace
agreement became a more plausible objective to both sides. This
change in political climate led to the eventual resolution of the
ruthless struggle of more than a decade.
93
B. Agreement for Intervention
Because the FMLN had not been defeated and maintained
considerable support within the country, it was able to negotiate
with the Salvadoran government on fairly equal ground to achieve
a far-reaching peace accord in exchange for ending the war. 4
Under the auspices of the United Nations, the FMLN and the Sal-
vadoran government negotiated a series of agreements, formally
concluding with the signing of the Salvadoran Peace Accords on
January 16, 1992, in Mexico City."
The two sides engaged in three years of discussions in an
effort to put an end to the violence. It became apparent, however,
that neither side wanted to lay down its weapons until a satisfac-
tory agreement could be met on implementing a system for an
impartial accounting of the past abuses. 96 They soon realized that
their mutual distrust would not allow them to agree upon any
group of Salvadorans to conduct the investigation. The country
remained highly polarized because neither side had won the war,
making it impossible to create a truth commission staffed by
Salvadorans." The parties eventually concluded that a special
body composed of a panel of distinguished foreigners would be the
only investigators both sides could agree upon to conduct the sen-
sitive inquiry.9 8 Once this agreement was formed, the official
91. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 502. U.S. military and economic aid amounted
to more than six million dollars. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 502.
92. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 502. The FMLN received substantial assistance
in the form of weapons and training from Cuba, Sandanista Nicaragua, the Soviet
Union, and other Soviet bloc countries. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 502.
93. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 502-03.
94. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 86.
95. See generally Path to Peace, supra note 3. The Salvadoran Peace Accords
consist of a series of agreements, negotiated over a period of more than three years
between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN. Two of these agreements
are: 1) the Mexico Agreements, April 27, 1991, at 13-3 1; and 2) the Peace Agreement,
Jan. 16, 1992, at 46-145 [hereinafter, respectively, the Mexico Agreements and the
Peace Agreement].
96. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 503.
97. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 87. See also Hayner, supra note 1, at
628.
98. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 503-04.
20021 169
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1
establishment of the Truth Commission was provided for in the
"Mexico Agreements," which were signed on April 27, 1991.- 9
The U.N. was already present in El Salvador to oversee the
negotiations, the demobilization of forces, the elections, and to
monitor any further human rights violations.' 0 It was only natu-
ral, therefore, that the U.N. oversee the Commission as well.'0'
Pursuant to its mandate, the Commission was to be comprised of
"three individuals appointed by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations after consultation with the Parties."' ' The U.N.
met no objections from either party to its choice of appointments.
The three highly respected international figures chosen to direct
the Commission were: Belisario Betancur, former President of
Colombia; Thomas Buergenthal, Professor of Law at George
Washington University and the former President of the Inter-
American Court; and Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart, former For-
eign Minister of Venezuela.' The staff consisted of fifteen profes-
sional staff and several administrators, none of whom were
Salvadorans due to the neutrality concerns mentioned above.10 4
To protect the integrity of the Commission, all funds and staff
came from outside El Salvador. 05 It was the first time the U.N.
sponsored an inquiry commission of this kind.' 6 It was also the
first time that the parties to an internal armed conflict had con-
ferred power on a commission composed of foreign nationals desig-
nated by the U.N. to investigate human rights violations
committed during the conflict and to make binding
recommendations.0 7
99. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 18.
100. Hayner, supra note 1, at 628.
101. Hayner, supra note 1, at 628.
102. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 29.
103. Hayner, supra note 1, at 628.
104. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 504. The staff consisted largely of lawyers,
sociologists, forensic anthropologists, and social workers drawn from other Latin
American countries, the United States, and Europe. The total number of staff
members ranged between twenty to thirty persons, including support personnel.
Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 504.
105. The Commission's work was financed by some two and a half million dollars
contributed to a special U.N. fund by the United States, the European Community,
the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries; the United States was the largest
contributor with one million dollars. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 504.
106. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 88.
107. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 501.
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C. Formation Through Completion of the Commission
1. The Mandate
The "U.N. Commission on the Truth for El Salvador" was cre-
ated in April of 1991 through the peace accords between the Sal-
vadoran government and the FMLN. 10 8  The Commission's
mandate gave it authority to investigate "serious acts of vio-
lence... whose impact on society urgently requires that the public
should know the truth" about what occurred between 1980 and
1991.109 The mandate purposely did not charge the Commission
with investigating all serious acts of violence. Rather, the main
focus was to be on acts that had a special or broader impact on
society in general."0 The commission was further charged with
addressing "the need to create confidence in the positive changes
which the peace process [was] promoting and to assist the transi-
tion to national reconciliation.""' Thus, the Commission was not
to lose sight of the fact that the promotion of national reconcilia-
tion was an overarching goal of the investigation."' Finally, of
great importance, the Commission recommended the legal, politi-
cal or administrative measures to remedy the results of the inves-
tigation, including measures designed to prevent the repetition of
the inhumane acts. 1 3 Not only was the Commission required to
give formal recommendations, but those recommendations were
also binding on both Parties because they had formally agreed to
carry out the Commission's recommendations."'
2. The Investigation
The Commission was given a six-month limit to carry out the
immense task of investigating twelve years of protracted vio-
lence." 5 Unofficial preparation and a two-month extension gave
the Commission just under nine months total."6 Consequently,
the Commission could only selectively investigate some of the tens
of thousands of cases that occurred during the war."' Given the
notoriety of a few cases that had received worldwide attention,
108. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 13, 18.
109. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 29.
110. Buergenthal, supra note 86 at 500.
111. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 30.
112. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 500.
113. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 30.
114. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 31.
115. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 88.
116. Hayner, supra note 1, at 628.
117. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 88.
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these cases were obviously targets for investigation. The problem,
however, was deciding which of the myriad other serious viola-
tions that had not received such publicity would be investigated.118
The Commission bought advertising space in newspapers, and
time on television and radio, encouraging those with information
to come forward with their stories. 119 Most people would not speak
to the Commission for fear of reprisals from the other side. The
Commission then turned to the opposing parties, asking for docu-
mentation relating to the alleged crimes. To the surprise of the
Commission, the government had not undertaken a serious effort
to investigate acts of terror attributed to the FMLN."2° The FMLN
was found to be equally unprepared to substantiate its charges
against the government. Turning to the United States for infor-
mation gathered in its long involvement in the Salvadoran conflict
resulted in the same disappointment of documentation. 2' Ulti-
mately, the only useful background information provided the
Commission in their initial investigations was from international
human rights groups.'22 As a result of these problems, during the
first few months of investigation the Commission felt that it
"would never be able to establish the truth with regard to many of
the most egregious acts of violence that had been committed."'23
This feeling of disappointment was, fortunately, premature.
In early November 1992, after about three months of investi-
gating, the Commission began to make real progress.'24 According
to member Thomas Buergenthal, three factors played an impor-
tant role in jumpstarting their investigation. 28 First was the
118. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 505.
119. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 505.
120. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 514.
121. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 514. The Commission had assumed that given
its support of the Salvadoran government and its intelligence capabilities, the United
States would have extensive information on the activities of the FMLN.
Unfortunately, the "material ultimately provided was of little value and extremely
slow in coming." Id.
122. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 513. International human rights groups had,
over the years, prepared extensive reports on El Salvador in general or on particular
cases or events. These provided useful background information and served as
guideposts for the Commission's investigation. Id.
123. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 514. In addition to the lack of information
obtained from the Salvadoran government, the FMLN, and the U.S., initial
interviews with military officers resulted in little useful information and more
frustrations. It was clear to the interviewers that the lives of those interviewed were
at risk because of the defensive walls that the military had built to protect itself.
Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 514.
124. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 516.
125. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 516.
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report of the Ad Hoc Commission. Second was the outcome of the
1992 U.S. presidential election. Finally, there was the belief that
the United States was providing the Commission with vast
amounts of information. The Ad Hoc Commission was created by
the Peace Accords 12 1 to review the human rights record of Salvado-
ran military officers, and given the power to make binding recom-
mendations on the dismissal of such officers. Its report, to the
surprise of the military, charged more than one hundred officers
with violations, including the Minister of Defense, General Ponce,
and other top officials. 127 Exposing the incipient weakness the
military was experiencing due to the Peace Accords, the report
convinced many that the changes in El Salvador were substantial.
With greater confidence, the people began to provide evidence.
Also, the belief that the Democratic Party would more fairly pro-
tect the Truth Commission and that the Clinton Administration
had supplied the Commission with nearly unlimited clearance to
examine documents on the conflict, convinced even more people to
cooperate.'28 As more information was obtained, additional leads
and information grew exponentially.'29 As a result, the Commis-
sion received more than 2000 testimonies about violations involv-
ing more than 7000 victims,' and registered more than 22,000
complaints of serious acts of violence that occurred in El Salvador
between January 1980 and July 1991. 13
The Commission received information that, upon corrobora-
tion, provided intimate details into past injustices because of the
change in attitude surrounding its endeavors. 32 Now the Com-
mission was in a position to give a valid report not only on what
happened, but as to which side was responsible, and who were the
individual perpetrators.' It became clear toward the end of the
126. Peace Agreement, supra note 95, at 49.
127. Tim Golden, Salvadoran Panel Calls for Purge of Defense Chief and 110
Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at Al.
128. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 518.
129. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 518.
130. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 88.
131. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
132. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 517. The Commission's power to make
recommendations concerning criminal trials and amnesties also helped convince some
perpetrators to come forward and provide the Commission with valuable information.
Once these few spoke others quickly realized, "that the protective dike they had
constructed was beginning to leak." This climate elicited more testimony from other
previously unwilling persons. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 517.
133. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 520. The Commission had gathered enough
incriminating evidence against even high-ranking government officials to feel they
could name perpetrators individually. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 520.
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investigation that the Commission intended to follow its mandate
quite literally and insure that "the complete truth be made
known.""4 To facilitate that goal, the Commission identified those
responsible by name."' This process, however, had implications
for high-ranking military officials and rumors began to circulate
that a military coup would take place if names were published."6
The campaign against publishing names was headed by President
Christiani, who warned the Commission that releasing the names
would undermine the national reconciliation."' Despite these
pressures the Commission maintained its neutrality and went for-
ward with the publication of names.
3. The Report
On March 15, 1993, the Commission's final unanimous,' 3
three-volume report [hereinafter the Report] entitled "From Mad-
ness to Hope," was made public by the Secretary General of the
United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali."19 The Report details
the results of the Commission's thorough investigation into thirty-
two cases. 4 ' It describes the individual cases that gained interna-
tional attention, as well as cases that were representative of the
violent conduct of one side or the other during a given period of
time.' In light of the Commissioner's belief that there would be
equal numbers of reprehensible acts committed by both sides, they
were surprised to discover that according to the investigation, no
such balance existed.' Rather, the truth of the violent war was
that "despite the massive wartime propaganda to the contrary,
the government side had committed a substantially larger number
of egregious acts than the FMLN."' In fact, of the 22,000 regis-
tered complaints, only five percent accused the FMLN.'" The
Commission found it far easier to identify the government mili-
134. Mexico Agreements, supra note 95, at 29.
135. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 519.
136. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 520.
137. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 520-21.
138. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 524-25. Despite the very different backgrounds
of the Commissioners, they tended to view most issues in much the same way. In fact,
during the drafting process, the Commissioners never once disagreed among
themselves with regard to any final decision included in the Report, and never took a
vote on any issues. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 524-25.
139. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 498.
140. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 88.
141. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 524.
142. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 528.
143. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 528.
144. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 18.
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tary officers who had committed or ordered serious acts of violence
compared to their FMLN counterparts because of the massive
amounts of information registered against the government.'45
In fact, the Commission found it almost impossible to fix indi-
vidual responsibility for acts of violence alleged against the
FMLN. 46 The Report, accordingly, dedicates more space to viola-
tions by the government than to the FMLN. In the end, the
Report named some forty military officers, many of whom were no
longer in active service. Six leaders of the Peoples Revolutionary
Army (ERP, one of the five leftist organizations composing the
FMLN) were named in connection with the multiple assassina-
tions of mayors.'47 Several judges and citizens were named, but
otherwise the Report did not name others who may have been
involved in planning or financing acts of violence. 4 s
4. The Recommendations
The Report contains a lengthy chapter setting forth the Com-
mission's binding recommendations.'49 The recommendations cen-
tered on changes the Commission felt would facilitate change to a
democratic form of government, where human rights are observed
and opposing views tolerated.50 Though the Commission could
have recommended judicial action against those named in the
Report, it forewent the option because it believed the existing jus-
tice system was incapable of doing justice.' It did not, however,
make any recommendation for amnesties for those involved, leav-
ing that decision to the people of El Salvador. The Commission
felt those identified in the report necessarily needed to be immedi-
ately removed from the offices that provided them with the
145. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 531.
146. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 531.
147. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 88.
148. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 88.
149. The mandate of the Commission included making legal, political or
administrative measures recommendation. Such recommendations may include
measures to prevent the repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national
reconciliation. See generally FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
150. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 534. See also FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra
note 18.
151. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 535-36. Although the Peace Accords called for
substantial reforms in the justice system, very few changes had actually taken place
or were likely to take place in the near future. The same judges who presided during
the war, including those accused by the Truth Commission of covering up various
crimes, would therefore be the same judges to adjudicate the charges brought forth in
the Report. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 535-36.
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authority to carry out the past acts. 152
Consequently, the recommendations decreed were as follows:
First, it called for all active military officers involved in the Com-
mission or cover up of serious acts of violence against civilians to
be removed from the armed forces.' 5' Second, the Commission
called for all those civilian government officials and members of
the judiciary involved in acts of violence to be dismissed.' Third,
it was recommended that legislation be adopted preventing those
implicated in serious acts of violence from holding any public
office for at least ten years.'55 Finally, and perhaps most contro-
versially, the Commission called for the immediate resignation of
all Supreme Court judges, and the appointment of new justices
under a new constitutional formula.
56
In addition to the recommendations made to ensure preven-
tion of similar violations in the future, the Commission also made
recommendations designed to promote national reconciliation.'57
It suggested a national holiday honoring the victims, as well as
the creation of a forum, comprised of representatives of all sec-
tions of El Salvador, to address the conclusions and recommenda-
tions of the Commission.' Finally, it called for the creation of a
victim's compensation fund financed by earmarking at least one
percent of foreign aid." 9
D. A Divided Nation Reacts
On the whole, the strongly worded Report naming over forty
individuals found responsible for human rights violations has
been well received by human rights activists and organizations
both in El Salvador and around the world. 60 The Report was less
well received by the Salvadoran government. When the Report
was issued, the military responded with the presentation of a long
written statement. The Minister of Defense presented the state-
ment on national television, declaring the Commission's actions
illegal under its mandate.' Within five days of the publication of
152. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 535-36.
153. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
154. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
155. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
156. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
157. FROM MADNESS TO HOPE, supra note 11.
158. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 537.
159. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 537.
160. Hayner, supra note 1, at 628.
161. Hayner, supra note 1, at 629.
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the Report the legislature, controlled by President Christiani's
party, passed a general amnesty to all those charged with political
and related crimes of violence, regardless of whether the perpetra-
tors were named in the Report.16 2 This measure, however, did not
disturb the Commission's report or recommendations because it
was not recommended that these individuals be judicially prose-
cuted. 163 The justice sought did not lie in the courtroom; rather it
was achieved in the imposition of moral punishment brought on
by the exposition of individual perpetrators' names. Notably,
regardless of the amnesty granted, part of the Commission's rec-
ommendations came to fruition with the retirement, within a
short time of the Report's issuance, of all military officers identi-
fied by the Commission."
Those resignations included Minister of Defense, General
Ponce, and the "retirement" of Vice Minister Zepeda. 15 In fact,
these officers would not have likely relinquished their power had
there not been a general amnesty protecting them once they
returned to civilian life. The continuation of impunity would have
been a virtual certainty had the Commission caved in to external
pressures and not identified names." In essence, the amnesty
actually facilitated the goal of the Commission. The diminished
military control paved the way for general democratic elections,
held less than two years later, in an atmosphere of freedom unpar-
alleled in El Salvador's history."'
Along with the new sense of freedom, the most important con-
tribution of the Commission was its psychological impact on the
people of El Salvador. " 8 Many Salvadorans had now heard the
truth about what they believed, knew, or refused to believe
occurred from a credible source. This had a profound effect on the
Salvadorans who for over a decade had been unable to separate
the truth from the lies and rumors. 69 To be able to tell their story
to someone who listened to them after so many years of silence
162. Hayner, supra note 1, at 629; See also Goldstone, supra note 40, at 613.
163. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 538.
164. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 538.
165. Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN
INST. Q. 69, 77 (Summer 1993). President Christiani also pledged to U.N. Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali that other senior officers would be placed on leave without
pay, with no official duties, by the end of June 1993, and retired by the end of the
year. Id.
166. Id. at 82.
167. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 538.
168. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 539.
169. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 540.
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and repressed anger truly brought reconciliation to countless
lives. 170 To see the results of their brave contributions in the
departure of some of the most powerful impetuses of violence in
their nation provided a much-needed feeling of vindication. The
moral redress and end to the distortion of truth allowed the
divided country to heal and move forward into a new democratic
era. The "veil of impunity had finally been pierced" and "the
denial of a terrible truth that divided a nation and haunted its
consciousness" had finally been removed, paving the way to
national reconciliation.17'
IV. COMPARISON OF COMPOSITION AND EFFECT OF THE
COMMISSIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES
As illustrated by the experiences of Chile and El Salvador,
there is no single formula for creating an effective tribunal to
investigate a violent past and promote a united future. The speed
and flexibility with which the truth commission operates allows it
to fit the mold of almost any nation in transition.72 It is the cha-
meleon-like nature of these organizations that allows them to
effectively ease the tensions in a politically charged nation and
move towards reconciliation. The different historical and political
backgrounds, and the immediate needs of each nation necessitate
that truth commissions differ in almost all levels of organization
and investigation.'73
In Chile, the end of a military regime gave way to a newly-
elected president bent on reconciliation. There the commission
was formed internally, composed of eight commissioners and a
staff of sixty fully funded by the new democratic government.174 In
contrast, El Salvador, arriving at a civil war stalemate, agreed to
foreign intervention and the formation of an independent U.N.-
sponsored truth commission.1 75 The Commission was conducted
by three foreign commissioners, who were widely known and
respected in Latin America, in an effort to maintain the integrity
170. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 539.
171. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 540-41.
172. See generally Hayner, supra note 1 (exploring how fifteen nations from around
the world have all used somewhat different forms of truth commissions in attempt to
help reconcile past injustices).
173. See generally Schlunck, supra note 8. (pointing out that truth commissions
vary from case-to-case, depending on such factors as set-up, design, responsibilities,
and mandate).
174. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 85.
175. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 501.
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of the process and the confidence of the people. 17 6 It was operated
by an international staff no more than half the size of Chile's and
was funded exclusively through international efforts.
In electing their new leader, the people of Chile entrusted
President Aylwin to fairly conduct the investigation into the past
without need of international assistance.'77 El Salvador, however,
remained controlled by the same government that had perpe-
trated many of the abuses to be investigated.7 ' The need for
objectivity and integrity to overcome the legitimate fears of abuse
of power could only be alleviated by the creation of a completely
independent tribunal.
These factors, context and immediate needs, also caused the
objectives of each commission to differ in scope corresponding with
the needs and fears of each country. For example, Chile did not
identify individuals by name, while the Commission for El Salva-
dor chose to name the individuals responsible. These decisions
reflected the government-controlled nature of Chile's commission.
Under an entrenched military regime with many officials respon-
sible for past injustice, Chile's commission did not attempt to
reveal individual identities. El Salvador's commission, however,
was able to withstand a major diplomatic offensive by the govern-
ment to rid the report of names because it was completely inde-
pendent of the government.'79
In addition, Chile aimed to investigate all past cases of
human rights abuses, some 3000 in total. El Salvador, on the
other hand, chose only to investigate "serious acts of vio-
lence... whose impact on society urgently requires that the public
should know the truth,"' some thirty cases as found by the Com-
mission. This was due to several factors. First, the commission
for Chile had a substantially larger commission than the Salvado-
ran Commission. Second, Chile had extensive judicial records of
the past crimes to facilitate a speedy investigation, whereas El
Salvador had almost no official documentation of past atrocities.
Finally, and most importantly, the scope of Chile's investigation
was much broader because it did not seek to isolate individual
responsibility while the Salvadoran commission did. Identifying
the entity responsible was almost common knowledge, but discov-
176. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 543.
177. See generally, INTRODUCTION TO CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 2, at xxiii.
178. Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 12, at 86.
179. Cassel, supra note 165, at 89.
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ering with certainty the names of the individuals responsible was
a painstaking task. The transition to a new democratic govern-
ment was well underway in Chile when the Rettig Commission
was formed, and Chile had no desire to begin assigning individual
blame to officials still in powerful positions for fear that it would
disrupt the democracy it was attempting to solidify.' For El Sal-
vador, however, identifying individuals by name was of the utmost
importance for true political change. In that small nation, the
people had seen so-called "investigations" in the past, and more
often than not they were publicity stunts staged by the Salvado-
ran government that produced "little information and less
truth.18
2
Thus, an independent commission that would investigate in
great depth the most serious acts of violence and name those indi-
viduals responsible was imperative for the authenticity of the
investigation. Confidence in the integrity of the Commission
would have been shaken if the investigation had not named
names because of a perception that the Commission had given
into political pressure. 83 Furthermore, the political pressure
imposed upon government officials named in the Report, and the
moral redress of public vindication afforded the victims in expos-
ing the individuals responsible, provided an impetus of change in
the existing government to allow a truly democratic governance to
take root.
The need for diversity of organized efforts to reunite nations
torn by past human rights abuses is exemplified in the compari-
son of the nations of Chile and El Salvador. These two nations
established truth commissions in an effort to uncover the reality
of past human rights violations, report the findings to the public,
make recommendations for changes to avoid repeating the abuses,
and ease tensions in their politically charged countries. Each
nation was able to uncover the truth and report it with legitimacy,
making recommendations that were for the most part sufficiently
attained. Abuses have been curbed into civil, tolerant societies as
the tensions of decades have given way to democratic peace. In
the end, the commissions for truth established by these nations
varied in nearly every facet but one, their success.
181. See generally, 1 CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 49 at 7; See also, INTRODUCTION
TO CHILEAN REPORT, supra note 2, at xxxii.
182. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 513.
183. Buergenthal, supra note 86, at 541.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Salvadoran and Chilean experiences suggest that an
external authority fulfills a somewhat different function than does
a national commission. While the Chilean version of the truth
commission may be more adept at promoting national reconcilia-
tion and acceptance by new government leaders of the state's role,
the Salvadoran method allows a greater measure of accountability
where internal political conditions might not otherwise permit.'"
The advance agreement by both sides in El Salvador to cooperate
with the investigation and to comply with its recommendations
gave it a great advantage. Though the resulting cooperation did
not exactly live up to the agreement, it did help accomplish far
more than if there were no agreement. 8' Chile, on the other hand,
had no agreement, as it was unnecessary because the existing gov-
ernment had created, funded, and controlled the commission.
Though this arrangement has potential for abuse, in the case of
Chile the power over the commission was necessary to preserve
the unity that had been attained. Ultimately, the Chilean state
publicly accepted responsibility and offered its apologies though it
had no agreement to do so.
In the end, whether the names of perpetrators are revealed,
whether trials are held, sentences imposed, reparations awarded,
or amnesty granted, it is not of great importance to a truth com-
mission. These are but considerations that fully depend upon the
political context, the nature of the compromise to end the conflict,
and the character of the nation."8 6 Rather, the crucial task of a
truth commission is to tell the story of what happened and to
insure that story is told truthfully. Only then can the wounds of a
nation begin to heal.
The truth commission is not the only measure necessary for
peaceful reconciliation and respect for human rights. Rather, it is
part of an overall institutional change that should be accompanied
by political, military, and judicial change, just to name a few.'
Far more than a truth commission will be necessary to heal the
wounds and create the conditions for a just society. 8 A change in
culture, expectations, and institutions are all required.8 9
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The truth commission may not conform to traditional norms
of reconciling past transgressions, but in the atmosphere of pro-
tracted violence it does achieve partial justice when the tradi-
tional institutions of justice are incapable of providing it. In doing
so it can help begin to bring together the people of a nation divided
by civil war and murderous regimes to create a climate in which
other necessary changes may take place.
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